Haggerty v. Associated Farmers of California, Inc. [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
2-4-1955
Haggerty v. Associated Farmers of California, Inc.
[DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Civil Law Commons, and the Civil Procedure Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Haggerty v. Associated Farmers of California, Inc. [DISSENT]" (1955). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 201.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/201
[1] 
ordinance 
voice to 
use of 
[3] 
F. 
county antinoise 
and an ordinance is 
it states that emitting 
sounds therein de-
and that distraction thereof '""1.1vu~1 
a hazard to persons using such 
"loud and 
and raucous 
§ 5. 
Todd & 
~'nforef•(L'' rt'hr 
it1at the orclinanre, upon 
of free 
Gl 
both t(~rms having 
Court of 
vacate the 
C. Todd for 
am1 certain county 
permml<'ll tly enjoin-
Ordinance No. 415 of 
thereof to 
conclusion 
abridges 
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Known as the ''Pres no Anti-Noise ' it 
makes unlawful the emi:-;sion or transmission of ''any loud 
and raucous noise upon or any 
or from any aircraft 
soever.'' A violation of ordinance 
fine not to exceed detention in 
a not in 
As defined raueous noise'' 
any 
kind not reason-
required in the thereof under the circumstances 
and shall inclmle bnt not be limited to motor 
aud the buzzing by 
'' 'l'he sound of the 
plosive except or with 
body having control of the 
"(3) The human yo icc or any record or reeording thereof 
when amplified by auy device whether electrical or mechanical 
or otherwise to such an extent as to cause it to carry on to 
private property or to be heard others the public 
highways or public 
" ( 4) Any sound not included 
of such volnme, intensity, or 
interfere with t!Je peace and 
property or other users of the 
oughfares.'' 
in the foregoing which is 
power as to tend to 
of persons upon private 
public highways and thor-
Shortly after its several persons were arrested 
upon eharges of ordinance. All of them were 
members or of the California State Federation 
of Labor or its affiliate, the National Farm r,abor Union, 
~:md when arrested they were '' along certain 
public highways or roads to farms. By means of 
automobile horm; and mounted on their cars, 
they were attempting to attract the attention of farm workers 
and to induce them to quit work and engage in a strike to 
enforce union demands for wages. 
C. J. Haggerty, the of the California State I'led-
eration of I,abor a11d a nwmber of its affiliated union, ~mecl 
to enjoin ihe enforcement of the on!i1Jance. 'l'be aetion was 
lJron~~ht 011 belwJf of him;.;elf a11d th(: wemb(•rs of the two 
labor tlwse JH:rsons ar-
rested for violating the ordinance. 
The trial comt found that, unless the law 
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crim-
members of tbe unions to 
to another finding, the 
federation and the farm labor union numerous members, 
each of them has an interest in the subject 
nn1praet1~~ao1e to all 
""y,,y,_.,.Tv was authorized to ""'"""""'!·<> 
to test the constitutionality 
conclusions that 
plaintiff, 
nl'A<U>t>11Tlroft under said Ordinance 
and use on the public highways 
and that the ordinance effectively pre-
.Lll<>vuu as it purports to prohibit the use 
upon the public highways and thoroughfares 
" it was concluded, the ordinance "is uncon-
stitutional upon its face as an the constitutional 
... ,,.au""'"' of the of free '' More specifically, the 
court held defining "loud 
and raucous noise'' ''the human voice or any 
record or when by any device 
electrical or or otherwise to such an 
extent as to cause it to carry on to 
heard others the 
" and concluded that definition "is so inseparable 
from the other of said Ordinance that the entire 
Ordinance must be found to be unconstitutional.'' 
The county and the county officials have appealed from 
and from an order to vacate the judg-
for reversal contend that the ordi-
nance is constitutional on even if it is uncon-
stitutional, they argue, has not shown a proper 
for equitable relief its enforcement. 
At the trial it was that the union members 
who were arrested were on a charge of violating 
uu•.a.u,oc 415. The did not include the particular 
of the applicable to the conduct for 
which the arrests were made. Attempts were made by Hag-
to show that ordinance is unconstitutional in its 
particular application to the activities carried on at the 
time of the arrests. He sought to establish the existence of 
free 
pro-
include 
of the 
v. N cw 92 L.Ed. 
] , an ordinance of ''any radio device, 
mechanical loud or any device of any kind 
the sound thercfeom is cast upon the streets 
... where ... maintained for advertis-
ing purposes or for the purpose of the attention 
of the or which is so and operated 
therefrom be heard to the annoy-
ance or inconvenience of travelers .. or of persons in 
neighboring 
was '' ublic '-'"'''"~uauu 
from the statutory ban 
radio loud -speakers, of 
concern and athletic 
obtained from the Chief of 
items of news 
activities . . . under 
Police.'' 
Saia, one 
a public 
without 
He was convicted in the state court of 
In the of of the 
up a loud-speaker in 
the 
programs 
chief of police. 
the ordinance. 
the 
''is unconstitutional on its face, for it 
restraint on the right of free speech 
in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by 
Amendment State action. To use a 
a from the 
'fhere are no standards prescribed for the 
exercise of his discretion. 'rhe statute is not 
to regulate the hours or of use of 
the volume of sound to which 
The ordinance therefore has all the vices of the 
ones which we struck down in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 LEd. 1213, 128 .A.L.R. 1352]; 
It 
same de-
the uncontrolled 
athwart the 
channels communication as an obstruction which can be 
removed after criminal trial and 
A effective 
weapon 
public life. Noise 
'fhe hours and 
But to allow the 
instru-
The sound truck has become 
It is the way 
. The present ordinance would be a 
if it were allo'wed to a hold ou our 
can be regulating decibels. 
of discussion can be controlled. 
because 
J heir use can be abused is like radio receivers because 
they too make a noise. The police need not be given the 
po>ver to a man the use of his radio in order to protect 
a neighbor 'l'he same is true here. 
''Any abuses which loud-speakers create can be controlled 
by drawn statutes. \\Then a allows an official 
to ban them in his uncontrolled it sanctions a 
device for of free communication of ideas. In 
this case a permit is denied because some persons were said 
to have found the sound annoying. In the next one a permit 
may be denied because some people find the ideas annoying. 
Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound. 
'l'he power of censorship inherent in this type of ordinance 
reveals its vice." (Pp. 360, 562 U.S.].) 
JVIr. Justice Frankfurter dissented with Justices Heed and 
Burton upon the ground that the lim]tations of the ordinance 
"upon the exercise of appellant's rights of utterance did not 
.. exceed the acconnnodation between the conflicting inter-
ests which the State was here entitled to make in view of 
time and place and circumstances." (P. 566 U. S.] .) 
Mr. Justice Jackson stated in dissent that no issue of free 
speech was involved. As he viewed the problem, it was one 
of regulation of the use of sound apparatus which, in his 
44 C.2d-3 
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Kovacs v. S.Ct. 93 L.Ed. 513, 
10 A.L.R.2d 608], concerned an ordinance under which one 
eould not lawfully operate ''for any purpose on 
upon the public streets, alleys or thoroughfares'' of the 
''any device known as a sound loud-speaker or 
sound amplifier, ... or any instrument of any kind or char-
acter which emits therefrom loud and raucous noises and is 
attached to and upon any vehicle .... '' Kovacs 1vas arrested 
when he operated a sound truck on a public street. The 
judgment of conviction was affirmed. 
A determination of the precise basis for the decision is 
made difficult by the number of opinions filrd. Mr. Justice 
Reed, joined by Mr. Justice Burton and Chief Justice Vinson, 
distinguished the Saia case upon the ground that the ordi-
nance there concerned allowed a previous restraint within 
the uncontrolled discretion of the chief of police. "This 
ordinance," they said, "is not of that character. It contains 
nothing comparable to the above-quoted ... [section] of 
the ordinance in the Saia case. It is an exercise of the 
authority granted to the city by New Jersey 'to prevent 
disturbing noises,' . . . nuisances well within the munici-
pality's power to control. The police power of a state extends 
beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, 
within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being 
and tranquility of a community. A state or city may prohibit 
acts or things reasonably thought to bring evil or harm to 
its people." (Pp. 82-83 [336 U.S.].) 
The opinion accepted the construction of the statute given 
by the New Jersey court as prohibiting vehicles with sound 
amplifiers emitting loud and raucous noises, and stated the 
decisive question as being "whether or not there is a real 
abridgment of tl1e rights of free speech." It was said that 
''even the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not 
absolute. The Saia case recognized that in this field by 
stating 'The hours and place of public discussion can be 
controlled.' '' Sound trueks, the opinion continued, create 
a problem which differs from other means employed to com-
municate ideas. "The unwilling listener is not like the 
passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but 
<'annot be made to take it. In his home or on the street 
he is practically helpless to escape this interference with 
AssoCIATED FAR1\IERS (W CALIF. 67 
r•xereise of 
broadeasts of 
144 C.2d GO; 279 I'.2d 7341 
from ways of 
the protl·etion 
for the 
business streets of (·ities like Trenton, ·with its more than 
123,000 sueh distraetions would be dangerous to 
t raffle at aH hours useful for the dissemination of informa-
i and in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and tran-
so desirable for city dwellers ·would likewise be at 
1 hr mercy of advoeates of particular religious, social or politi-
(·al JWrsnasions. \Y e eannot believe that rights of free speech 
a rmmicipality to allow such mechanical voiee ampli-
fleation on any of its streets. 
'' 'rhe right of free speedr is guaranteed every citizen 
that he may reach the minds of willing listeners . . . [but] 
[ i] t is an extravagant extension of due process to say that 
because of it a city cannot forbid talking on the streets 
through a loud speaker in a loud and raucous tone .... 
Opportunity to gain the public's ears by objectionable sound 
on the streets is no more assured by the right of free speech 
than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on 
ihe streets. . . . Section 4 of the ordinance bars sound trucks 
from broa(1easting in a louc1 and raucous manner on the 
streets. There is no restriction upon the communication of 
ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by news-
papers, by pamphlets, by dodgers. \Ve think that the need 
for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses 
from the distracting noise;,; of vehicles equipped with such 
l'onnd amplifying devices justifies the ordiname." ( 836 U.S. 
86-89.) 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice ,Jackson concurred 
;;eparately. lVIr. Justice Rutledge stated his vieiYS in a dis-
senting opinion and Mr. ,Justice Black's conclusions in criti-
eism of the decision were approved by Mr .• Justice Douglas 
and Mr. Justice Rutledge. Mr. Justice Mnrphy dissented 
1vitlwut opinion. 
;\:-; 1 he ordinallt·(~ of l•'rest1o ( ~ouniy 'lw·s 11ot 
to any person or agency a discretion in determining who may 
operate sonnd amplification devices, it is not subject to at-
68 
1rhat 
what may nor discriminate among those who would 
mal\e inroads upon the it is not for us to super-
vise the limits the in 
absolute 
upheld. 
the United 
whether any situation an 
the use of sound trucks may be 
Commentntors in the field of constitntional law are 
1n See comments, 
22 So.CaLhHev. 41G; 626; 34 Io1Ya ILRev. 
()81; Mich.L.Hev. 1007; 14 Mo.L.Rev. 194; ()2 Harv.h 
Hev. ) The has cited the Kovacs case as a recogni-
of the state to within constitutional 
of a com:rrrumt 
S.Ct. 9~0, 95 
arl i ficially 
( P11bl1:c Util-
06 I1.Ed. 
some state eon rts have up-
the use of sound trucks. 
voice when 
vices 
It 1s of the limitation 
upon the volume with which sound trucks may be operated 
to exclude them from use upon the of the county. 
may be conceded that limitations are some-
what than those the ordinance in the 
Kovacs case, but little if any difference 
to the restrietions upon volnme. 'l'here the court 
determination of "loud and raucous" made in 
sufficient to justify the ordinance to Kovacs. 
In a footnote to the opinion of Mr. Justice Reed are 
from the in the state court 
were relied upon as sufficient to justify that determination. 
It was observed: "The New Jersey courts may have concluded 
that the necessity of search by the to locate the 
sound truck on a street was sufficient evidence of loudness 
and raucousness'' and again: ' the last-quoted para-
assumes that all sound trucks Joud and raucous 
noise.'' (P. 84, fn. The limitations the defini-
tions included within the ordinance are no more re-
strictive than those the Court. 
The present ordinance is declared to be an emergency 
measure ''necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public well-being and safety." The statement of that neces-
70 HAGGERTY v. A~~OCTATED FAlL\! Ert,.; OF CALIF. C.2d 
is as follows: "The of 
highways and 
craft 
air-
enjoyment of 
private property, and the distraction thereof inter-
feres with the traveling public a hazard to the 
interferes \Yith the 
of persons said highways and " 
The in the exercise of the 
state, has a legitimate interest in the 
and tranquility of its citizens. It cannot be said that the 
ordinance is not directed to that end. 
[3] Haggrrty, howewr, rPntenrls that 1 he ordillance also of-
fends the of due proeess in its otl1cr l1efinition:s of 
the activities properly to be included within the seope of its 
prohibitions. The contention that ''loud and raucous'' itself 
is so vague and indefinite as to establish no ascertainable 
standard of guilt was passed upon in the KoYacs case, where 
it was pointed ont that " [ w] hile these are abstract words, 
they have through daily use acquired a content that conveys 
to any interested person a sufficiently aecnrate concept of what 
is forbidden." (336 U.S. 79.) 
[4] A similar contention is made \Yith regard to the 
definition in clause one as including the noise of "the motor 
of any automobile, truck, tractor, or aircraft of 
any kind not reasonably required in the operation thereof 
under the circumstances .... '' It is argued that ''reason-
ably required" is too Yague and indefinite a standard of guilt. 
Reliance is placed upon cases which have held to be too in-
definite such phrases as ''reasonable profits,'' ''greater or less 
than real value," "current rate of per diem wages in the 
locality where the work is performed.'' (Cline v. Frink 
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 [47 S.Ct. 681, 71 L.Ed. 1146]; Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 [34 
S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284} ; Connally v. General Construction 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 [46 S.Ct. 126, 70 r~.Ed. 322} .) These 
cases, however, involve loose definitions in fields where gen-
erally there may be great differences of opinion as to V\'hat 
conduet may be reasonable. A restriction upon the operation 
of motor vehicles so as to eliminate unreasonable noises 
operates in an area where a determination as to what is neces-
sary and reasouable may be made more precisely and has a 
content of fairly fixed meaning to operators of such vehicles. 
More nearly in poiut are prohibitions against "unreasonable 
or unsafe speed" (held constitutional in Ex parte Daniels, 
HAGGERTY 1:. AssoCIATED PARMERS oF CALTY. 71 
144 C.2d 60: 279 P.2d 734] 
P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172]); and the use 
loud or harsh sound.'' 
Code, § 
[5] Clause four is attacked on the same ground of in-
definiteness because of the use of the phrase ''of such volume, 
, or power as to interfere with the peace and 
" of other persons on private property or on the high-
way. does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
''peace and quiet,'' but concedes that if the entire 
ordinance were equated to that standard it would withstand 
constitutional challenge. His objection is to "interfere," and 
"tend to interfere" with such peaee and quiet. 'fhere is no 
merit to this contention. Both ''interfere'' and ''tend'' have 
well recognized, defined meanings. (Of. Conger v. Italian 
Vineyard Co., 186 Cal. 404, 407 [199 P. 503] ["the term 
'interfere' bears the significance of 'disarrange', 'disturb', 
'hinder'."]; State v. Hopkins, 64 N.D. 301 [252 N.W. 48, 51] 
['"fhe word 'tend' means to be directed or have a tendeuey 
to any end, object or purpose.''] ; Smulson v. Board of Dental 
Examiners, 47 Cal.App.2d 584, 587 [ll8 P.2d 483] [up-
holding a statute prohibiting advertising statements which 
are of a character "tending to deceive or mislead the pub-
lic."].) 
Other contentions made by Haggerty, if accepted, would 
not require the court to hold that the ordinance, upon its 
face, is unconstitutional. Insofar as they tend to establish 
the inYalidity of the ordinance in its application to him, they 
may be considered upon a retrial in connection with that 
question. 7\o other points relied npon reqnin' discussion. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, ,J., Schauer, J., and Spence, .J., conellrred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The sound trucks involved in the present controversy were 
being used on the highways and on roads adjacent to farmR 
for the purpose of attracting the attention of farm workerR 
as a means of inducing them to quit work and engage in a 
strike to enforce union demands for higher wages. 
According to the majority opinion the question presented 
for determination is whej her the prohibition of the ordinance 
under consideration is a reasonable one. 
The ordinance (No. 413, clause ( 3) of subdivision (d) of 
section 2.) with which we are here concerned defines "loud 
sl1all not be abridged. 
of the human voiee as the 
ordinanee in 
human 
and thorough-
are not con-
on ''private 
' but that 
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on public highways and 
of free speech guaranteed by the 
Constitution includes uot the right to be free from re-
in the privacy of one's own home, but the 
to reasonable regulation, to speak in other places 
may be reached. As the Supreme Court of the 
States said in Saia v. Sew York, 334 U.S. 558 [68 
92 hEd. , "Loud-speakers are today indis-
instruments of effective public speech. The sound 
truck has become an accepted method of political campaign-
iug. It is the way are reached .... " What may be 
permitted in some other place has no bearing whatsoever on 
the public and thoroughfares; what may be per-
mitted in the way of the normal human voice or music on 
highways is innnaterial when one considers that the human 
voice is effectiYely silenced when not amplified through a 
loud-speaker when ideas are sought to be disseminated from 
the public highway. One may cry aloud his ideas in the 
wilderness, but that is surely not an effective way to share 
those ideas with the segment of the public one wishes to reach. 
'l'o prohibit the use of sound trucks on public highways and 
thoroughfares is to prohibit the dissemination of ideas to a 
segment of the population which probably could be reached 
iu no other way. Sound trucks on public highways are the 
way many "people are reached." A writer in 34 Cornell 
Law Quarterly 626 points out with considerable merit that 
it is unrealistic to argue that what is meant by freedom of 
is the native pmYer of human speech. The fact that 
earlier holdings of the court only went so far as to uphold 
the right of unamplified speech does not imply that " ... one 
is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in 
abridged on the plea that it may be exer-
cised in some other place." (Schneider v. Irvington, 308 
U.S. 147, 163 [60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155].) Similarly, it 
is unsound to argue that one may not be permitted to use a 
loud-speaker beeause free speech could be exercised in some 
other manner-that is, without an amplifying device. The 
broad language of the various opinions makes it plain that 
c-onstitutional free speech is not limited to ancient forms of 
expression. 
In Sa1:a v. New York, supra (334 U.S. 558, 559, 560, 561) 
where a permit was required for the use of a sound truck, 
1\'Ir. Justice Douglas speaking for a majority of the court, 
said that the ordinance in question '' ... establishes a pre-
vions restra illt on of 
First Amendment which is 
Arnemlnwnt State action. 
amplifier OlJC' lias to 
'l'here are no standards 
disc ret ion. 'l'hc statute is 
violation of the 
1 he J<'ourtrentl1 
or 
Chic£ of Police. 
of his 
thP hours or or 1 }],, yolume ol' 
so1!JH1 (the must be u,;kd. The 
ordinance therefore has all the vwes of the Olles which Wl' 
struck dom1 iu Cantwell v. 310 U.S. 2DG [GO 
S.Ct. 900, 84 lJ.Ed. 128 A.IdL 
:30:3 U.S. 444 S.Ct. hEd. 
C.l.O., :307 U.S. 496 
court also said: "Loud-speakers 
struments of effective public specd1. 
l.Jl:(:ome an accepted method of 
1 he way people are reached. . . . 
83 L.Ed. The 
indispensable in-
The sound truck has 
cam paig uing. It is 
''The present ordinance woulcl be a dangerous weapon if 
it \\"ere allowed to get a hold on om· public life. Noise can be 
regnlate(l by regulating decibels. The hours and place of 
publie discussion ean be controlled. Bnt to allow the poliee 
to bar the use of loud-speakers bceanse 1 heir use ean be abused 
is like barring radio receivers because 1hey too make a noise. 
The police needuot be giwn the power to deny a mau the usc 
of his radio in order to protect a against sleepless 
nights. 'fhe same is true hrre. 
'' ~tl,.ny abuses which loml-speakers create can be controlled 
by narrowly drawn statntes. \Vhen a allows an official 
to ban them in his uncontrolled diseretion, it sanetions a de-
vice for suppression of free communication of ideas. In this 
ease a permit is denied because sc>mc persons were said to 
!Ja,·e found the sound annoying. In tlw next one a 
may be denied because some people find the ideas annoyillg. 
Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound. 
The power of censorship inherent in tlJis type of ordinance 
reveals its vice.'' 
'l'his is the only clear-cut expn'ssi(Jll by the Supl'cme Court 
of the United States. Tt is admitte(1 in the opinion 
in the present eas(~, and by all leg-al writers nnd eommelt-
1ators (62 IIarY.lJ.HeY. 1228; 47 lVIieh.hHcv. 1007: 97 U.Pa. 
L.Rev. 7:30; 34 Cornell L.Q. G26; 34 I(nva L.Hev. 681; 14 JVfo. 
hRev. 194; 22 So.Cal.L.Hev. 416) tlmt the later case of 
Ko1,acs v. Coopc1', :3:l6 l:T.S. 77 [69 S.Ct. 448, 9:3 L.Ed. fi1:3, 
10 A.L.R2d ti08l, ·while easting some doubt on the holding in 
Feb. l HAGGERTY v. AssociATED PARi\rERs OJ·' CALIF. 
144 C.2d 60; 279 P.2d 734] 
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hr Saia ease, because of the many opinions, has caused 
" eonfusion" m the field of regulation of sound 
trucks. 'l'here is no decision in the Kovacs ease 
which as the in effect does that sound 
tnwks may br prohibited since three of the ,Jus-
1 ices Bul'ton and 
1 he grou nil that the state courts had it not as an 
absolute but as sound trucks that emitted 
"loud and raucous noises." The Saia case expressly points 
out that "[a]ny abuses which loud-speakers create can be 
eontrollctl drawn statutes." Also, as pointed out 
in lhe Saia case, an ordinance could be dravm relating to 
such sound trucks by regulating the volume of sound, the 
of use in the interests of the public peace 
illH1 1rithout imposing either a prior, or absolute, 
rPstraint on the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
Htates. As \HlS pointed out in an article in 22 So. California 
r,aw Heview 416, 420, the crucial problem is one of differ-
entiating bet\reen the right of local government legitimately 
to exercise proper regulations which will encroach on 
constitutional rights, and the right of a group of individuals 
to be secure in their exercise of a constitutionally given free-
dom. A balance has been struck in other fields where in-
dividual freedoms must be some\Yhat circumscribed in the 
interest of the pnblie p:ood. No good reason appears why the 
same thing may not be accomplished in this field without the 
of absolute prohibition. 
'l'he onlinanee involYed in the Kovacs ease related to the 
ttse of sound trucks on the public streets, alleys or thorough-
fares within the city of Trenton, New ,Jersey. The area 
in the ordinance here involved is not so circnm-
seribed. In State v. Headley, (Fla.) 48 So.2d 80, an ordi-
nanee of the City of Miami prohibited the operation on city 
streets of yehieles to whieh meehanieal loud-speakers had 
bren aitachecl. It \Yas held there that the right of a citizen 
to use the public streets was not absolute and unconditional 
but might be controlled and regulated ill the interest of the 
public good. '!'he appellant in the Headley ease was arrested 
for a lo1d-speal\er attached to his vehicle while ou a 
downtown steeet whid1 was l;ighly eongested with traffic. 
In Brinkrnan v. City Gainesville, 83 Oa.App. 508 [64 
8.E.2(1 3,14], an ordinm1ee prohibited the operation of a loncl-
speakrr npon ihc streets of the city of Gainesville. '!'he ordi-
76 HAGGERTY v. AssociATED FARMERS OF CALIF. [44 C.2d 
nance was held constitutional as not violative of the free-
doms of speech and religion. The ordinance involved in the 
case at bar makes unlawful the emission or transmission of 
'' ... any loud or raucous noise upon or from any public 
highway or public thoroughfare or from any aircraft of any 
kind whatsoever.'' 
It may be agreed that Jl.fr. Justice Reed was correct when 
he said (Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 82 [69 S.Ct. 448, 
93 L.Ed. 513, 10 A.L.R.2d 608]) that " nrestrained use 
throughout a municipality of all sound devices 
would be intolerable." He added that " bsolute prohibi-
tion within municipal limits of all sound amplification, even 
though reasonably regulated in place, time and volume, is 
undesirable and probably unconstitutional as an unreasonable 
interference with normal activities." (Emphasis added.) 
I would affirm the judgment to the extent that it enjoins 
enforcement of clause ( 3) of subdivision (d) of section 2. of 
Ordinance No. 415 on the ground that it is unconstitutional 
on its face as an abridgment of freedom of guaranteed 
to the individual by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States. I express no opinion 
concerning the constitutionality of the balance of the ordi-
nance in question. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
Respondent 'R petition for a 
Hl55. Gibson, C .• J., Cartrr, .J., and 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
